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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 17-2009 
________________ 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
  
RAHEEM HASAN CARNEY, 
       Appellant 
 
     ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(W.D. Pa. No. 1-15-cr-00019-001) 
District Judge: Honorable David S. Cercone 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 6, 2018 
 
Before: MCKEE, AMBRO, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 30, 2018) 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Raheem Hasan Carney conditionally pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(e) and possession with intent to 
distribute less than 100 grams of heroin under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(c).  He 
appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion to suppress on the basis that a warrant 
issued to search his residence was not supported by probable cause. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s denial of a motion to 
suppress anew as to questions of law and for clear error as to the underlying facts.  United 
States v. Ritter, 416 F.3d 256, 261 (3d Cir. 2005).  We review the Magistrate Judge’s 
issuance of the search warrant to determine whether there was “a ‘substantial basis’ for 
concluding that probable cause was present.”  Id. at 262 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 236 (1983)).  While we exercise plenary review of the District Court’s 
consideration of that question, id. at 261, we pay “great deference” to the Magistrate’s 
original determination, id. at 264 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 236). 
A magistrate issuing a search warrant must make a “practical, common-sense 
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, . . . 
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a 
particular place,” and thus there is probable cause to search it.  Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.  
Contrary to Carney’s argument, the facts provided in the affidavit in this case were 
sufficient for probable cause. 
The affidavit described that a confidential informant (“CI”) told police she had 
illegally purchased cocaine at Carney’s residence on several recent occasions and had 
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seen firearms there.  The affiant, Pennsylvania State Trooper Troy Owen, stated he had 
arrested Carney at least twice in years past for drug-related offenses and knew he was a 
convicted felon not permitted to possess a firearm.  According to the affidavit, within two 
days prior to the search warrant request, the CI performed a controlled drug buy at 
Carney’s residence under careful surveillance of Pennsylvania State Troopers, who 
searched her and her vehicle both before and after she entered Carney’s residence.  The 
CI entered the residence with money provided by the Troopers and left with a baggie of 
cocaine.  This information provided the Magistrate a substantial basis to grant the warrant 
to search Carney’s residence. 
Carney also argues that the Magistrate was misled by certain omissions from the 
affidavit in violation of Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).   He asserts the 
Magistrate should have been informed of the CI’s previous conviction for theft by 
deception, that she had violated parole by purchasing drugs, and that she may have held 
hard feelings toward Carney because of a prior physical altercation with him.  These facts 
might have undermined the CI’s credibility in the eyes of the Magistrate—though the 
affidavit acknowledged that the CI had purchased cocaine recently, and “magistrate 
judges . . . often know, even without an explicit discussion of criminal history, that many 
confidential informants ‘suffer from generally unsavory character’ . . . .”  United States v. 
Avery, 295 F.3d 1158, 1168 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 
968, 985 (11th Cir. 2001)). 
However, the CI’s claims regarding Carney’s drug dealing were also corroborated 
by the controlled buy at Carney’s residence.  The CI’s credibility thus reasonably could 
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be considered either proven or irrelevant by a magistrate.  In short, even if the affidavit 
had contained the additional facts Carney argues were impermissibly excluded, the 
probable cause analysis would be no different.  See Franks, 438 U.S. at 156 (holding “the 
search warrant must be voided” only if the affidavit, as amended, “is insufficient to 
establish probable cause”); see also United States v. Frost, 999 F.2d 737, 743 (3d Cir. 
1993) (“[W]here an omission, rather than a misrepresentation, is the basis for the 
challenge to the affidavit, a court should ask whether the affidavit would have provided 
probable cause if it had contained a disclosure of the omitted information.”). 
We therefore affirm. 
